China’s tightening grip on a little-known rare earth metal has pushed the United States into an unlikely lifeline: stockpiles left in an abandoned French factory. To keep F-35 fighters and Tomahawk cruise missiles on track, U.S. defense planners are now reaching back into this old European inventory rather than relying on fresh supplies from Chinese producers. The scramble highlights how a single mineral, and a single country’s export policy, can ripple through the most advanced weapons programs in the world.
The shift from Chinese suppliers to legacy French stock is not a sign of industrial nostalgia, but of strategic vulnerability. China’s export restrictions on samarium, a key ingredient in high performance magnets, have exposed how deeply the United States defense sector depends on foreign-controlled supply chains. The emergency drawdown of old material is buying time, but it also underscores how far Washington still has to go to secure the building blocks of modern warfare.
China’s samarium squeeze hits the F-35 program
At the heart of the problem is samarium, a rare earth element used to make samarium cobalt magnets that can keep their magnetic properties at temperatures high enough to liquefy lead. These components are essential in systems that must operate under extreme heat and stress, including the engines and guidance units of advanced aircraft and missiles. Reporting on Samarium notes that these magnets are embedded in Tomahawk missiles and other key defense applications, which places them squarely inside the supply chain for the F-35 and similar platforms.
China has moved to restrict exports of samarium, using its dominant position in rare earth processing to exert leverage over Western militaries. One detailed account describes how China’s export restrictions on samarium have raised direct security concerns for the United States and its allies. Another report explains that the chokehold China placed on the supply of samarium had the potential to halt production of critical defense systems, including the F-35 and Tomahawk, until U.S. defense giants were given a lifeline from an unexpected source in France. Together, these accounts show that the pressure is not theoretical: it is already reshaping how the United States sources the metals that keep its most advanced jets flying.
From abandoned French factory to frontline jets
To avoid a production standstill, U.S. contractors and officials have turned to stockpiles of samarium held at an abandoned factory in France, drawing on material that had been left unused for years. According to reporting on how the United States was choked by China, this French cache effectively gave U.S. defense firms a lifeline, allowing them to keep F-35 fighters and Tomahawk missiles in production despite the squeeze on fresh samarium exports. The image is striking: cutting edge American aircraft and missiles depending on material salvaged from a shuttered European plant, simply because the primary global supplier has turned off the tap.
This workaround underscores how brittle the supply chain has become. Instead of a diversified network of mines and processors, the United States is leaning on a one time stockpile that cannot be easily replenished. The French material may sustain production for a period, but it does not solve the underlying dependence on Chinese controlled processing and export capacity. As one analysis of the chokehold on samarium makes clear, the West’s militaries are exposed as long as a single country can decide how much of a critical mineral reaches global markets. The French factory stock is a stopgap, not a strategy.
Past F-35 supply scares foreshadowed today’s crunch
The current scramble for samarium comes after earlier supply chain alarms inside the F-35 program. In one high profile episode, U.S. defense officials temporarily paused deliveries of the fighter after discovering that a component contained Chinese sourced material. The incident, described in detail in coverage of how the Pentagon Temporarily Halts F-35 deliveries due to Chinese parts, showed that even when the aircraft itself is assembled in the United States, its subcomponents can still trace back to suppliers in China. The pause was not about performance, but about the security and political implications of embedding Chinese materials in a flagship U.S. jet.
Within weeks, the Pentagon moved to resume deliveries after conducting a national security review of the issue. Reporting on how the Pentagon decided to resume F-35 deliveries after Chinese materials were discovered explains that The Pentagon approved a national security waiver, allowing the program to move forward despite the presence of Chinese sourced content. The episode foreshadowed the current samarium crunch by revealing how deeply Chinese materials had already penetrated the F-35 supply chain, and how difficult it would be to unwind that dependence quickly.
Strategic stakes for the United States and its allies
The reliance on Chinese controlled minerals is not limited to a single aircraft program. Analysts have warned that the United States defense machine, across multiple systems, relies on China for critical inputs. A recent segment on whether the United States can make F-35s without relying on China notes that right now the United States defense machine relies on China, but the hope is that new magnet technologies could change that dependence. This assessment aligns with broader reporting that China’s export restrictions on samarium have raised security concerns across Western militaries, not just in the United States.
For allies that operate the F-35 or depend on U.S. missile systems, the French stockpile solution offers only limited reassurance. If the United States is forced to ration samarium based on what remains in an old European warehouse, partner nations could face delays in deliveries or upgrades. The same reporting that describes how the United States was choked by China also makes clear that the French stockpile is finite. Once it is gone, the underlying question returns: can the United States and its allies field advanced weapons at scale without access to Chinese processed rare earths.
Can new supply chains break China’s grip?
U.S. policymakers and companies are trying to build alternatives before that question becomes acute. One avenue involves developing domestic or allied sources of samarium and related rare earths, along with the processing capacity that China currently dominates. Reporting on Samarium and U.S. rare earth ventures highlights efforts to secure supplies for Tomahawk missiles and other defense applications through new mining and processing projects. These initiatives aim to ensure that the magnets inside F-35s and cruise missiles can be sourced from within the United States or trusted partners, rather than from Chinese controlled chains.
At the same time, engineers are exploring magnet designs that reduce or replace the need for samarium altogether. The discussion in the DW News segment on whether the United States can make F-35s without relying on China points to research into alternative materials that could maintain performance without the same vulnerability to export controls. However, such technological shifts take years to validate and integrate into certified military hardware. Until those alternatives are proven and scaled, the United States will remain caught between China’s export policies and the dwindling reserves of an abandoned French factory, a precarious position for the world’s most sophisticated fighter jet program.