Acting Secretary of the Navy Hung Cao said he was the first foreign official to board a Vietnamese warship alongside Vietnam’s navy, during a visit to Cam Ranh International Port in late June 2026. In a video message posted to X, Cao explained why access to the strategically located port mattered to the U.S. Navy’s broader posture in the region. “Together, we’re so strong. We are a very powerful navy, but we’re not that big that we can have ships all over the world, and that’s why we need allies and partnerships,” Cao said.
Why Cam Ranh Bay Matters
Cam Ranh Bay is widely regarded as one of the finest natural deep-water harbors in Southeast Asia. The bay stretches roughly 20 miles north to south and up to 10 miles wide, with a narrow strait leading into its inner harbor that provides year-round shelter from monsoons and typhoons. The port’s deep water allows it to accommodate the largest vessels in any navy’s fleet, including aircraft carriers and submarines, a relatively rare combination of geographic advantages in the region. The bay sits directly on the South China Sea roughly 950 nautical miles from the Strait of Malacca, positioning it along critical sea lines of communication that connect the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
A Long History of Foreign Military Interest
Cam Ranh Bay’s strategic value has drawn the interest of foreign militaries for more than a century. The bay sheltered the Russian imperial fleet en route to its defeat at the Battle of Tsushima in 1905, and was used by French colonial forces, the Imperial Japanese Navy ahead of its invasion of British Malaya in 1942, and the U.S. military, which built major air and naval facilities there during the Vietnam War. Following the war, the Soviet Union signed a 25-year lease for the bay in 1979, eventually making it the largest Soviet naval base outside the Soviet Union itself, before Russia’s presence wound down and formally ended in 2002.
Vietnam’s Decision to Reopen the Port
Vietnam began modernizing Cam Ranh Bay between 2011 and 2014, hiring Russian consultants and purchasing Russian technology to convert the former military base into a commercial logistics and ship-repair facility open to foreign navies. The first phase of that effort came to fruition in March 2016, after which the renamed Cam Ranh International Port began hosting visiting warships from a range of countries, including the United States, Japan, India, Singapore, France, and Australia. According to the Observer Research Foundation, the move was widely interpreted as a deliberate “soft balancing” strategy by Hanoi against Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, allowing Vietnam to deepen ties with multiple major powers without entering a formal alliance, consistent with its longstanding “three no’s” foreign policy: no military alliances, no foreign military bases, and no policies directed against any other state.
What Access to the Port Actually Provides
For the U.S. Navy specifically, access to Cam Ranh’s repair facilities carries both logistical and strategic value. In his video remarks, Cao said the port visit was important “because it allows us to bring in ships to do some maintenance and repair operations, and open up the ports a little more for us to visit Vietnam more frequently.” Forward access to a major repair facility in the South China Sea reduces the distance and time required for American ships operating in the region to return to a friendly port for upkeep, extending how long vessels can remain deployed forward without returning to bases in Japan, Guam, or the continental United States.
Historical U.S. Engagement With the Port
Cao’s visit echoes a pattern of senior American officials using Cam Ranh Bay visits to signal the deepening U.S.-Vietnam relationship. According to an official Department of Defense account, then-Defense Secretary Leon Panetta visited the port in June 2012, becoming the first U.S. Cabinet-level official to do so since the Vietnam War, addressing sailors aboard the USNS Richard Byrd, a Military Sealift Command supply ship moored in the harbor. Panetta said at the time that access for U.S. supply ships to the bay’s repair facilities was important “not only for logistical reasons but for its political implications,” and that working with Vietnam on “critical maritime issues including a code of conduct focusing on the South China Sea” remained a priority.
Vietnam’s Careful Balancing Act
Despite deepening cooperation with the U.S., Vietnam has consistently declined to grant any country exclusive or permanent military basing rights at Cam Ranh, instead keeping the port open to multiple foreign navies simultaneously. Vietnamese officials have stated on multiple occasions that Hanoi has no interest in signing a military basing agreement with any single country, preferring instead to preserve flexibility and pursue closer relations with several powers simultaneously. Analysts have noted that if any one major naval power gained permanent, exclusive access to the base, it would significantly complicate any other country’s ability to exercise control over the South China Sea, even one holding most of the disputed islands in the region.
That balancing extends to Vietnam’s continued relationship with Russia at the same facility. Russia has retained simplified naval access to Cam Ranh even after formally withdrawing its forces in 2002, and Vietnamese officials have allowed Russian bombers to refuel at the adjacent airfield in the past, a practice that has previously drawn concern from the U.S. State Department even as Washington pursued its own deepening access to the same port.
The Broader Strategic Backdrop
Vietnam’s interest in deepening defense cooperation with the U.S. has been driven in large part by ongoing territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea, where Beijing claims sovereignty over the vast majority of the waterway. Vietnam has separately built up its own naval capabilities at Cam Ranh, including a fleet of Kilo-class submarines purchased from Russia, and has restricted public access to nearby islets as part of developing the bay into a more advanced naval facility for its own forces. Retired U.S. Navy officials have long described the port in similarly stark terms; Jerry Hendrix, a retired Navy captain and defense analyst, has said that “Cam Ranh Bay is a crucial port in the region that strategic planners have missed since the day we left.”
Retired Adm. Robert Natter, a former commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet and Vietnam War veteran, has framed the deepening relationship as a natural response to changed circumstances rather than a departure from history. “I think it’s a good idea, times change and we’ve got to adjust with the times,” Natter has said. “We have more in common with Vietnam today than separates us, at least on a strategic level. The reality is the geography would indicate that a closer relationship would be appropriate, especially with the actions of the Chinese in the South China Sea.”
What Cao’s Visit Signals
Cao’s claim to being the first foreign official to board a Vietnamese warship marks an incremental but symbolically significant step beyond previous American engagement at the port, which had largely centered on U.S. ships visiting Vietnamese facilities rather than American officials boarding Vietnamese vessels directly. Whether the visit translates into expanded, regular U.S. naval access to Cam Ranh’s repair facilities, or remains a largely symbolic milestone in the broader bilateral relationship, will likely depend on how the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the two countries continues to develop in the months following Cao’s trip.
Neither the Vietnamese government nor the U.S. Navy has indicated any plan to alter Vietnam’s longstanding policy against granting permanent or exclusive foreign basing rights at Cam Ranh, meaning any expanded American access is likely to continue taking the form of periodic visits and repair calls rather than a fixed U.S. presence at the port.