“At the present time we have only enough water for two weeks. Please supply us immediately.” American sailors on Midway sent that plea on May 20, 1942, and none of it was true. The message was bait, written to make Japan name its own target, and it worked two weeks before the carriers met north of the atoll.
The ruse settled an argument inside the U.S. Navy about where Japan would strike next. Its answer decided where the Pacific Fleet’s carriers would be waiting when the first aircraft launched.
The text of the message and its date come from Smithsonian Magazine’s account of the battle, written by Meilan Solly, the magazine’s senior associate digital editor for history, in November 2019, which says plainly that “the base was not, in fact, low on supplies.”
Station Hypo and the “dungeon”
The men who designed the trap worked at Station Hypo, the Navy’s code-breaking unit in Hawaii. Commander, Navy Region Hawaii’s history of the station says it sat “in the nondescript basement of building 1, the administrative headquarters of the 14th Naval District,” a large windowless room its occupants called the “dungeon.”
Hypo was led by Cmdr. Joseph Rochefort. Before Pearl Harbor, the Navy Region Hawaii history says, American code-breakers “were still unable to read the Japanese operational code known as JN-25.” By March 1942, it says, that code had been broken. Smithsonian Magazine puts it the same way: cryptanalysts and linguists under Rochefort “broke the Japanese Navy’s main operational code in March 1942.”
Breaking the code did not mean reading every word. Japanese messages referred to a coming invasion target only as “AF,” according to the Navy Region Hawaii history, and the location behind those two letters was the question.
One officer’s guess against Washington’s
Rochefort read “AF” as Midway Island, and he expected the Japanese to attempt the invasion around June 4, per the Navy Region Hawaii account. Not everyone agreed. “Rochefort was convinced ‘AF’ stood for Midway, but his superiors in Washington disagreed,” Smithsonian Magazine writes. The Navy Region Hawaii history says many in Washington thought the Aleutian Islands were the likelier target.
That disagreement, the Navy Region Hawaii history says, left Adm. Chester W. Nimitz with a difficult decision about how to use his limited forces.
How the water message was sent
The plan, as the Navy Region Hawaii history describes it, came from Hypo’s code-breakers. A message went to Midway over the undersea cable instructing the garrison to send a false radio report in the clear, unencrypted, that the island’s fresh-water system had malfunctioned.
Midway sent the plea on May 20, 1942, according to Smithsonian Magazine. Tokyo Naval Intelligence picked it up, the magazine says, and passed it along, reporting that the “AF” air unit was in dire need of fresh water. Hypo, in turn, intercepted a Japanese message saying “AF” was having trouble with its fresh-water system, the Navy Region Hawaii history says.
The two letters and the island were now one and the same. In Smithsonian Magazine’s telling, the ruse confirmed the target’s identity and spurred the Navy to decisive counter-action.
Four carriers north of Midway
Nimitz ordered his available carriers north of Midway to intercept the Japanese strike force, according to the Navy Region Hawaii history. Smithsonian Magazine names the American carriers as Yorktown, Enterprise and Hornet, and the Japanese carriers in the area as Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu.
The battle was fought between June 3 and 7, 1942, Smithsonian Magazine says, and Japan lost all four of those carriers. The United States lost one, the Yorktown. The Navy Region Hawaii history credits the result to both halves of the effort: the intelligence that put the American carriers in position and the pilots and crews who sank four Japanese fleet carriers.
Hypo did not stay in the dungeon. In April 1943, its history says, the unit moved out of its cramped quarters in building 1, its most consequential piece of deception already a matter of record.